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Introduction:
“In the first half of this century an amazing reversal took place—Turkey became a healthy
nation in a relatively sick world.”   This event, after the First World War, was one of the more1
controversial, mind-changing events of the early twentieth-century.  The majority of the world
considered the Turkish people to be finished and defeated, but the Turkish National Struggle
(1919-1922) proved this opinion quite wrong.  This paper examines the factors behind this
successful national movement and the birth of the Republic of Turkey by offering comparative
insights into contemporary accounts of the National Struggle to close in on the truth.
This understanding of the subject will involve analysis and comparison of primary
sources (in English) representing several different viewpoints of the period.  The Turks were the
only defeated people of the First World War to force a rewriting of the peace terms imposed on
them at Versailles.  The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) left the Turks with but a small part of central
Anatolia and the Black Sea coast, and yet they managed to achieve victory in their National
Struggle of 1919-1922 and force the Allied powers to a renegotiation of peace terms in the Treaty
of Lausanne (1923), thereby recognizing the emergence and legitimacy of the Turkish Republic.
Among the primary sources that will be examined are those of Rafael de Nogales
Méndez, a Venezuelan mercenary; Grace Ellison, an English journalist; Ahmed Emin Yalman, a
Turkish journalist and nationalist; Arnold Toynbee, an English scholar (who switched from a
pro-Greek to pro-Turk stance during the period); Halide Edib (Adývar), a Turkish nationalist and
woman writer; and A. A. Pallis, a Greek administrative officer.  These observers imply a variety
of reasons to explain the success of the Turkish Nationalists, including, among other factors,
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Turkish / Nationalist will and spirit, dynamic leadership, rivalries between and poor intelligence
and lack of support for Turkey’s opponents, and the Greek landing at Smyrna.
Historical Setting:
From the mid-nineteenth century to the formation of the modern Republic of Turkey, a
series of reform movements influenced the direction of the declining Ottoman Empire.  The
Tanzimat period (1839-1871) saw the Ottoman Empire enact numerous reform programs to
improve the efficiency of the empire such as the army, education, bureaucracy, and
administration.  Foreign pressure and “a genuine belief that the only way to save the empire was
to introduce European-style reforms” pushed the Tanzimat forward.   One of the most important2
resulting trends of the Tanzimat period was in education, where secularization became more
common and professionally training colleges for the bureaucracy and army were a priority.3
French ideas of liberalism and nationalism spread through the Ottoman translation bureau
during the 1840s.  Namik Kemal, a bureaucrat there at the Ottoman Porte, adapted the Ottoman
language to create vocabulary capable of expressing these new nineteenth-century Western ideas. 
Such actions were followed by the formation of secret societies and the dissenting Young
Ottomans.   Later, during the harsh and repressive rule of Sultan Abdülhamid, dissenting exiles4
of the Ottoman government formed the secret group that became the Young Turks (and the
Committee of Progress and Union [CUP]).  The Young Turks were conservative and wanted to
transform but preserve the empire.   With a power base in Salonika as the Ottoman Freedom5
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Society, the CUP began the Young Turk Revolution in July 1908 to force a new constitutional
regime upon the Ottoman Sultan and government.6
Opposition parties were able to muster substantial support against the CUP until the loss
in the First Balkan War, 1912.  Then through 1913 to 1918, the CUP regime ran the empire
under the leadership of essentially three men.   The Ottomans signed an alliance with the7
Germans on 2 August 1914 and attacked Russia on 29 October; the World War for Turkey had
begun, with France and Britain declaring war on the Ottomans by 11 November.   The Ottomans8
maintained armies along four to five fronts throughout the course of the war in spite of heavy
losses.  During the war, the CUP government – facing Armenians encouraged by the Russians to
rebel – responded by deporting and clearing areas of Armenians, which resulted in the massacre
of a large percentage of Armenians.  Counter-massacres of Muslims also occurred and furthered
the violence in eastern Anatolia.   The CUP regime was motivated by nationalistic security9
reasons.   Due to threats on Istanbul from Entente forces in Salonica and Thrace, the Ottomans10
accepted the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918.
Istanbul and the straits were officially occupied by Entente forces from March 1920 to
October 1923.  The Greek army landed in Smyrna on 15 May 1919 and advanced east into
Anatolia.  The Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) disposed of all Ottoman territory and left the
Turkish people, by default, with part of central Anatolia and the Black Sea coast.  British Prime
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Minister “Lloyd George, more than any of his colleagues, was imbued with the old Gladstonian
tradition of Philhellenism and hatred of the barbarian Turk. . . Unfamiliar with the physical facts
of the situation in Anatolia.”   The West during this period had little respect, if not hatred, for11
the Turkish people, upon whom they attributed many massacres and oppressions.  A product of
nineteenth century Romanticism during the Greek Revolution in the 1820s had been a renewal of
interest and love of classical Greece.  For these ingrained British sentiments, Lloyd George had
worked to force pro-Greek and anti-Turkish policies (in spite of the technical situation and actual
feasability of the policies).
The early invasion of the Greeks at Izmir had officially started warfare and the Turkish
National Struggle; so Sèvres was never actually ratified.  Mustafa Kemal arrived at Samsun on
the Black Sea coast on 19 May 1919 and began organizing a national resistance and nationalist
congress.  He resigned and refused to be recalled by the Istanbul government, eventually forming
a separate governing National Assembly in Ankara.  Success in Anatolia by the Nationalists
forced the renegotiation of peace terms at the Conference of Lausanne (November 1922 -
February 1923).  In part due to the Greek defeat, (referred to as the Chanak Affair in Britain)
Lloyd George’s coalition lost reelection in Parliament to Conservatives.  No longer Prime
Minister, he was incapable of forcing his foreign policy, and Foreign Minister Lord Curzon
represented the British at Lausanne.   The Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) overturned Sèvres12
only as it concerned the Turkish Republic not the other former Ottoman territories.13
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General Nogales:
General Rafael de Nogales y Mendez was a Venezuelan rebel and a self-titled ‘soldier of
fortune’ as ‘mercenary’ he felt was an inaccurate and disrespectful term.  After his many years of
fighting, hunting, and traveling the world, he wrote two books describing his time among Turks:
Four Years Beneath the Crescent and Memoirs of a Soldier of Fortune.  In Turkey, he states, he
was known as Nogales Bey, a Turkish divisional commander.  In a preface of his Memoirs,
Lowell Thomas states Nogales was the last Turkish military governor of the Sinai Peninsula, a
Knight Commander  of the Order of Mejedieh, and a Knight of the Iron Class.    As an expert14 15
soldier and experienced commander, Nogales declared Turks to be one of the greatest and
unmatched breed of soldiers.  
Critically, while his opinion and memoirs are valuable, Nogales inevitably must suffer
some measure of bias from fighting alongside Turks and watching them give their lives under his
leadership.  Reflecting on his time with them he remarked, “Whenever I remember those scenes
of almost incredible valor, I cannot help feeling proud of having led those brave and modest
‘unknown soldiers’ of the Ottoman Empire . . .”   However, Nogales also suffered from the16
western approach of generalizing and Orientalizing the people of Turkey and the Middle East. 
Numerous times throughout his memoirs, he placed actions upon groups of nameless Turks.  He
attempted to understand Turks, “by a process of reasoning natural to the Oriental mind”.  17
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Nogales criticized Westerners who doubted the civilization and cultured nature of the Near East,
but he then stereotypes “the ancient and immutable culture of the Orient” .  He declared that “no18
doubt that the Turk . . . is the first soldier and the first gentleman of the Orient.”   Yet, his19
opinions and approach was hardly out of place for the period.  According to his reports, British
commanders fighting them agreed that they were the “first gentlemen” and “unanimously
declared the Turk to be a ‘clean fighter’”.20
A soldier of fortune had to take part in the Great War.  Going to Belgium to try and join
their army for World War I due to a past relationship to their king, he found himself undesired
and shunted aside by the Allied militaries.  Describing his efforts to enter the conflict while in
Dunkerque, Nogales wrote, “The armies were pounding at each other like the devil, and it made
my heart feel light.  ‘Yawash, yawash!’ as the Turks say.  I was nearing my goal slowly but
steadily.”   It did not matter entirely to him for whom he fought so long as he could fight (and21
his services were desired).  His only comment on the matter, “After all, a cause is a cause.  It may
be more or less just; what is said in its defense may be more or less true.  Who can be certain? 
But la guerre c’est la guerre—and I, being a professional soldier, naturally had to take a hand in
the war.”   22
In spite of fighting alongside the Turks, Nogales still had reason to dislike and distrust
them.  Noting an insubordinate officer in charge of his artillery, he tersely jested “beware of the
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Turk when he smiles!” .  He was “the only Christian among the sixty thousand Turks who had23
put down the Armenian revolution” and was witness to its “hideous crimes”.   As a result of24
viewing the massacres during the suppression of the Armenians, he concluded, “So it came about
. . . that I was sent to render those services with the secret understanding among certain leaders
that, when my task was done, I was not to leave the scene alive.”   Despite being a marked man,25
he still yet maintained a professionalism and respect about the situation noting that “among my
would-be assassins . . . there were others who had for me, as I for them, a strong personal liking
and respect; chief of these latter was the Secretary of War, Enver Pasha.”   Nogales, in spite of26
any emotional biases a soldier may suffer from war, took the events of his life in a fairly
professional manner.
General Nogales’s work continually stressed the incredible spirit and valor of the Turk. 
As a soldier who had fought in Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, the Caribbean, and China, lived in
the wilds of Alaska, wrangled in Nevada, and had relationships with men in leadership across
Europe as well as the Americas, it suggests that even as a sweeping generalization the fighting
spirit of Turks was common enough to make an impression upon this worldly soldier.  On a
purely technical perspective, Nogales complemented the Turks as “excellent artillerymen and
machine-gunners.”   “While commenting upon the Turkish soldier, I shall add that in my27
opinion neither Europe nor America can offer a soldier who learns the management of arms and
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military evolutions so easily as the Turk . . .”   Nogales’ views support a conception of a Turkish28
military tradition giving Turks a national advantage against their enemies.
Combining his personal observations with his general understanding of Ottoman
conquests, he concluded, “The indomitable courage or fanaticism . . . and the traditional boldness
of the Osmanli, frequently . . . offered sublime examples of that ferocious endurance which, from
time immemorial, has made them famed as one of the most valiant and most warlike nations of
the Old World.”   So “courageous” and “ferocious” was their spirit that seeing them die without29
any complaints, “not even a moan—[Nogales] could not help remembering Napoleon’s famous
words: ‘With Turkish soldiers commanded by foreign officers I would have been able to conquer
the world!’”   Several times, Nogales’s memoirs reflect upon the Turks faced supposed30
innumerable odds and certain defeat.  In spite of being “doomed” and knowing it, “Nevertheless
they continued fighting savagely, in an almost, suicidal manner”.   Even with little or no hope,31
the Turkish soldiers fought hard for their lives anyway.  As observers like Yalman noted, those
officers who survived the war – either by combat skill or desertion – returned to fighting with
even more dedication for the National Struggle.
The victorious Allied powers had rivalries and jealousies over their own influences and
power in the East.  For this reason, Nogales proposed, it was likely France and Russia refused
Britain’s suggestion to aid Armenian rebels before the World War fearing it would strengthen
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British positions in the East.   General Nogales left Constantinople to return to the West as the32
news was arriving of Mustafa Kemal’s declaration of armed revolution protesting the Allied
intervention in Turkish affairs.  Nogales wrote in his closing, “This reaction in favor of liberal
nationalistic principles in the Ottoman Empire has been the true cause of the complete failure of
the Allies in everything touching their Near-Eastern policy.  It will continue to be the motive of
serious armed conflicts so long as the Entente persists in the partition of . . .” the regions.   By33
suppressing the people with occupation attempts, the Allies were pressuring the people to adopt
more of the nationalist ideas that the Westerns brought to the Near East in the first place. 
General Nogales did not doubt the abilities and resolution of the Turkish people writing:  
Many a Turkish proverb explains why the apparently clumsy and slow-witted
Turk usually has his way when he settles down to business . . . . There is a lot of
philosophy in that simple system of yawash, yawash, equivalent to “take it easy;
don’t get rattled!” which, when applied to politics or warfare, represents the real
reason why the European nations, in spite of their many efforts, have never been
able to put anything over on the wily Turk.  Once the Turk has made a resolution
it is almost impossible to beat him at his game.34
The Allies would end up seeing only an apparent uncivilized and “slow-witted” and beaten Turk,
and miss the resolute face of the Turks until forced to accept that the Turk refuses to stay beaten
in his homeland.
General Nogales took little note of those events not concerning himself.  Given his
profession and other exploits, readers of his memoirs should be cautious of exaggerations for the
purpose of self-grandeur.  In summation, Nogales Bey wrote, “. . . my contention that the Turk is
one of the most enduring, best-disciplined of soldiers.  I would pity the European officers who
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should try to submit their troops to the hardship and misery which the Turkish soldier suffered
during the war.  Yet our askars never uttered a word of complaint, but stumbled along starving
and fighting for the glory of the crimson crescent and the cause of the Mohammedan world until
merciful death finally put an end to their sufferings.”   As the Turks were nearing the end of the35
war, Nogales recounted that “In both groups of allies there were those weary of shedding the
national blood on alien soil for gains that daily became more doubtful.”   If Nogales’s troops36
were willing to fight with such dedication and endure such suffering fighting the Entente in the
Caucasus and Sinai, he could not imagine any European force achieving a complete victory
inside Turkish rather than foreign soil.  Other observers would note in more detail that during the
Nationalist Struggle, Turks fought for what remained of their national homeland not in alien
lands like the Western forces.
Grace Ellison:
Grace Ellison was an English journalist and the first Englishwoman to visit the
Nationalist capital Angora (Ankara) after the Nationalist movement and struggle began.  As she
traveled to Turkey (from Istanbul to Izmir and through the interior to Ankara during late autumn
of 1922 to 1923) and the Lausanne Conference (1923), she wrote and recorded impressions and
conversations creating the book An Englishwoman in Angora.  Her explicitly stated purpose
throughout the memoir and its foreword was to preserve a future for Turkey and Great Britain by
preventing further war between the two nations.  Her goal in presenting this information was to
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attempt to stop “the unreasoning hostility” towards Turks and show Turks that “one
Englishwoman can stand out against injustice.”37
As a professional journalist, Ellison stressed her desire to tell the truth and remain
independent.  She claimed, “I shall describe what I see as I see it; and if anyone can prove me in
error, I will correct my statements and apologise.”   In terms of being published, she additionally38
stated that, “If the articles in which I have told the truth are not published you will know the
reason.  The editor has his opinions, and I refuse to change mine.”   As a seeker of truth, Ellison39
appeared to be observant and respectful, writing “I, personally, can respect those with whom I do
not agree, even those who, on behalf of their own country, dislike mine.”   In fact, she suffered40
criticism by a Chicago correspondent who called Prime Minister Lloyd George her “uncle.”  In
response to this, she respectfully stated that “Lloyd George would never lift a finger to help ‘his
niece,’ . . . Yet ‘his niece’ will continue to defend him against ‘unjust’ attacks, and criticise him
also.”   In the service of facts, she decried slander but still gave voice to horrible truths.  The41
level to which she was able to maintain this professional behavior was to a degree limited,
however.
Ellison displayed an intriguing perspective, yet the very fact that she gave an explicit goal
and purpose to her travels raises the concern that she was less than an impartial, honest observer. 
The most glaring problem with trusting Miss Ellison to have gotten a pure account of balanced
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facts is that she lacked an understanding of the Turkish language outside of common phrases. 
When interacting with Nationalists unable to speak English, she would simply repeat the phrase
“M. Kemal Pasha Chok Guzel [sic]” , meaning “Mustafa Kemal Pasha is very nice” (“very42
pretty”), to communicate that she was a supporter.  Despite being British, she voiced a passionate
love for both Britain and Turkey.  It is evident that Ellison had a pro-Turkish view.  She
mentions that the horrific actions of the Greeks were “amply sufficient to justify any slight
Turkish excesses that may have occurred in Smyrna,” essentially voicing a free-pass to any
crimes in response by the Turks.   Her treatment here was nearly the opposite extreme of that of43
Western leaders like Lloyd George, who wanted to persecute the Turks and support the Greeks.
Yet similar to many contemporaries and General Nogales, Ellison fell victim, to an
extent, to cultural bias.  In agreement with Nogales’s generalizations about Turks, she wrote,
“His personal nature is uncomplaining . . . . Herein lies at once their great weakness and their
great strength.”   Further, Ellison refers to “a primitive and Asiatic charm in Angora, . . . to44
‘keep them holy’ from the materialism and the intrigues of Western commerce-Empires.”   It45
would seem odd that a person asking for Turks to be respected and treated as equals to Europeans
would make such generalizations about these peoples as “Asiatics” or “Orientals,” but a view of
certain peoples as lesser, partially stemming from social Darwinism concepts, was pervasive still
during her lifetime.  As such, it would appear that her love of the Turkish people and culture
imbued her with a maternalistic feeling toward aiding them.
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Meanwhile, Ellison displayed no hesitation to assault the policy, behavior, and morals of
her own British government.  Numerous references were made to the “folly” and “foolishness” of
British governance.  For example, criticizing the influence and power of Lloyd George, she
wrote, “I scarcely expected that they, or any foreigner, could realise the full measure of England’s
folly in putting the whole machinery of government into one man’s undisputed control.”   In her46
view, England with its “foolish visions” and Greece with its “arrogance” were both “fellow-
burglars”47
Among the visible reasons for the Nationalist Struggle and its success, Ellison pointed to
the actions of the Allies, particularly England, as being irrational.  From her perspective, the
Turkish people had a great respect and admiration for Britain even after the Armistice.  However,
this sentiment converted quickly with the Greek occupation.  According to Ellison, “We had
foolish visions of a new Byzantium, and thought that Greece would reward our support by a
‘place on the Bosphorus.’”  In her eyes, “Our rulers, and [Greek Prime Minister] Venizelos,48
have wasted the precious blood of Europe to flatter their personal vanity and nurse an idle
imperialism for Greece”.   She did not see any legitimate reasoning for the policy chosen by49
Lloyd George.
The Allied leaders were not only acting irrationally but, as she and others she met with
believed, also were quite misinformed.  From her observations, Ellison contended that the
Howard 15
Ibid., 59.50
Ibid., 304.51
Ibid., 119.52
Ibid., 280.53
Ibid., 287.54
Ibid., 302.55
Western powers still treated the Turkish people “as an ‘inferior’”.   Even at the time of the50
Lausanne Conference, she noted that, “. . . the general attitude—in England and the
Continent—is still based on our interpretation of the ‘old’ Turkey.  Our experts, for example, in
Constantinople [Istanbul], still approach the Nationalists as they were accustomed to order about
Abdul Hamid’s Turks.”   This was poor policy, as the Nationalists wanted nothing more than to51
rule themselves without foreign interference and demands.  Unlike the French, the British had no
official representative in Ankara to gather intelligence from the Nationalists; rather the British
criticized the French.   Ellison wrote that an Englishman, “Mr. D——, who was in52
Constantinople all through the war, and is convinced that the English were, throughout, entirely
misled by Greek and Armenian dragomen [Turkish-language translators].”   It hardly seemed53
logical to use enemies of the Turks as translators under the Allies.  Even General Harington from
the British Headquarters in Turkey, supposedly, told Ellison that “I can only suppose that, for
some reason, Mr. Lloyd George simply refused to listen to the advice of everyone who knew
Turkey, in favor of friends entirely ignorant of the whole subject.”   The result of poor54
information was entirely negative.  As far as Ellison is concerned, “It is, no doubt, largely due to
the great difficulty of obtaining first hand news, that most people are anti-Turk.”   Poor55
intelligence caused several obstacles to the Allied occupation plan.
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To a limited extent, Grace Ellison’s account suggests rivalries (and jealousy) between the
Allied nations over Eastern interests and rewards.  In 1922, Ellison suggested, “How is it, then,
that we have so consistently failed to quiet the Turkish storms?  Of course, every one of the
‘powers’ has been involved, each playing for its own hand, striving to end or prolong the war in
its own interests.”   Evidently, there were rumors known to Ellison that France was playing56
Turkey against England.  She noted, “Since my return I have been frequently asked to explain the
role of the French colonel in Angora.  I cannot feel that his presence implied any disloyalty to
Great Britain.  Again and again we have been asked by France to modify our policy in the Near
East.  But as neither threats nor coaxing has availed to save us from being the tools of designing
Greece, France was driven to ‘make her own arrangements.’”  In spite of these fears of French57
betrayal, in reality, Ellison claimed that French diplomat Franklin-Bouillon advised Turkey “to
preserve good relations with England.”58
Both Ellison and several Nationalist Turks she communicates with attribute the growth of
Nationalism to two specific parts of British (Allied) policy – allowing the Greeks to occupy
Smyrna in May 1919 and the Allied official occupation of Istanbul with arrests and exile to Malta
of influential Turks in March 1920.  Ellison stopped at Malta prior to arriving in Turkey and
referred to the occupation and Malta exiling as “the English coup d’état!”   The Minister of the59
Interior, Fethi Bey, a prisoner at Malta, perhaps in slight exaggeration, told her, “Turkey owes
him [Lloyd George] a debt of gratitude we can never repay . . . . But for the occupation of
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Smyrna, and the Malta coup d’état, there would have been no Nationalists.  But for your Prime
Minister we might all of us have been vassals.”   Additionally, he explained that he and other60
prisoners took advantage of their position to learn English to better ‘understand their enemy.’ 
Ellison expressed the sentiment that the Malta incident created such a number of martyrs and
nationalist sentiment that “the word ‘Malta’ may soon be safely translated ‘patriot’.”   Then after61
reaching Ankara, Ellison concluded, “All the best men exiled, persecuted, and imprisoned.  What
wonder that Nationalism had grown into a religion!”   Interacting with the Turks in Ankara in62
1922, Ellison noted that “I am not allowed to forget that it was England who really created the
Nationalist Assembly—May [this error contradicts her earlier, accurate reference to March] 16,
1920, is the historic date—when we took possession of the Turkish Parliament . . .”   The63
imprisonment of 150 patriotic intellectuals led to the demand of a Nationalist Assembly.  
Ellison suggested that the defining impetus and heart of the Nationalist will was the
Greek occupation and atrocities.  After the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, Ellison asked one of
their delegates, “‘how a Turk could be found to sign such a Treaty.’  ‘Had we not signed,’ he
answered, ‘the Greeks would have entered Constantinople . . .’”   Ellison implied that they64
hoped to save bloodshed.  Yet, the outcome was quite the contrary.  Turkey had been disarmed,
and in May 1919 Greek troops occupied Smyrna.  Ellison declared that after the Mudros
Armistice, any terms would have been accepted to reach peace except the Greeks at Smyrna. 
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Even after war and defeat, Turks, she chronicled, still much admired England, until this
particular policy, she declared, “transformed the veneration [for England] of her [Turkey’s]
people into fear and distrust, if not hate.”   Ellison’s boat traveled from Athens past Smyrna on65
its course to Constantinople.  Giving her first impression of the ruin caused by the violence
between Greeks and Turks, she wrote, “As the lightning begins to play over the land, the ‘shells’
of houses and their hollow interiors stand out clear before us—a picture of horror and desolation
it would be hard to match.”   When she eventually reached Smyrna, she mentioned that flies66
swarmed everywhere “in thick layers,” which a Danish merchant attributed to their “fattening on
corpses!”   This disturbing detail gives distinct sense of the destruction.67
Later, as Ellison traveled through the interior of Anatolia toward Ankara, she stopped at
and visited several ruined towns, which she found similar to one another.  At this point in her
account, she claimed that “at Manissa, no more than one thousand houses standing out of
fourteen [thousand]!”   In Broussa (Bursa), she saw “everything” noting that “They [Turks] had68
been swept off the face of the earth with the village in which they dwelt, by the Greeks.”   The69
sights of that place, with women dying of festering hatchet wounds, disturbed Ellison, who had
seen horrors of war before along the French front during World War I.  As result of her
observations, Ellison declared, “Everywhere in Anatolia I found clear evidence that Greeks
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indulged in the worst type of barbarianism. . .”   In particular sights such as those in Bursa, she70
stated were not “legitimate warfare,” and as a result, “. . .this butchering of women has put the
Greek outside the pale of civilisation.”   Doubtless, the images she saw (and the context she was71
given) reinforced some bias in Ellison’s perspective of the atrocities of the Struggle; however, it
is impossible to deny that these horrors inspired resistance and nationalism among the population
of Anatolia to push out the Greeks and reverse the terms of Sèvres.
The resentment of the Turks continued after the Greeks had been defeated and Smyrna
had been retaken by Nationalist forces in September 1922.  At Smyrna, Ellison saw “Greek flags
used as mats—dishonoured and trampled with Turkish mud!”   Furthering the dedication to the72
furor of nationalism was the sentiment among Turks of being blamed for atrocities without
Greeks being judged by the world.  This feeling was expressed to Ellison by her Turkish guide in
Smyrna, “There was grim disgust and disdain in his last comment: ‘And all this funniness is
supposed to have been done by us!’”   At Ankara, Halide Edib Adivar informed Ellison that73
“‘This eternal and unjust fault-finding with the Turk not only breaks his spirit . . . , but incites
him to do things he never otherwise would think of doing.  It is a most dangerous policy.’”  74
Many Turks, based on this statement, had reached or approached a feeling of nothing to lose.
Ellison attributed the success of Kemal’s Nationalist forces to the spirit of the Turkish
people.  Attempting to understand the actions of Turks as she passed through Anatolia, she
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wrote, “How is it these women can, even now, tenderly hush ‘the cry of the children,’ and give
their men?  Theirs is a ‘willing’ sacrifice for an ideal, the freedom and independence of the
Fatherland.”   The nationalist spirit placed a free and independent Turkey above the pains of the75
individual.  Ellison provided a “tale of a patriot” she heard,
A certain woman, so poor that she had but one miserable garment to protect her
starving babe, catches sight of some “munitions” that are lying near her, exposed
to the cold!  She does not hesitate a moment, but lifting her poor child’s only
covering, carefully wraps it round the “instruments of war.”  “Maybe the good
God will send me another child,” she whispered; “at all costs, my country must be
saved!”76
The story had an evident impact on Ellison though one has to doubt the validity of such an
extreme, wild, second-hand tale.  Truth or exaggeration, the story was a pure example of how
much Turks were willing to pay for freedom.
The impression presented by Ellison is that given how much those in Anatolia had lost,
they were willing to sacrifice all that was left, including themselves, for the future of Turkey. 
Ellison recollected that in Paris autumn 1920, just after the Treaty of Sèvres, “When I asked the
boy [of a Turkish writer she was looking after] whether they had any hope of success, he just
flashed out: ‘They must succeed.  His [M. Kemal’s] stars are ‘right.’  He could not fail!’”  77
While many Turks were desperate for a successful National struggle, some doubted the
possibility.  According to Ellison, Ottoman Turkish diplomats in Istanbul “one and all, declared
he would fail” because they did not believe victory could be achieved against the Greeks,
Armenians, and French without money or munitions.   In an interview with Mustafa Kemal at78
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Ankara, he told Ellison, “Those who would still challenge our claim to the complete
independence that we are determined to secure will have to find means to exterminate all Turks
now inspired by that ideal.”   Mirroring this sentiment, Halide Edib at Ankara then declared to79
her, “It has cost us such a terrible price in lives and suffering to save our land, we naturally would
all die now rather than live in slavery again.”   The Nationalists communicated to Ellison a80
belief that the spirit of the movement could not be defeated unless all Turks died, a fate they were
willing to risk.
In stark contrast to the Turkish spirit and will, Ellison echoed the common belief that the
Allies lacked the will and determination to make the necessary sacrifices to defeat the
nationalists.  Ellison, in her travels through the interior of Anatolia, declared to numerous town
meetings with local Turks that “Maybe the British Government would scarcely have approved
our meeting; but there are many people in England who take a different view”.   The British81
people were not willing to endure more war expenses in resources and lives, and their
unwillingness contributed to the Conservative victory in Britain’s Parliament ending the coalition
government of Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George (who had been much of the driving force
behind the pro-Greek policies).  While the Turks obtained munitions and supplies wherever
possible, whether it be from Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, or even Greeks, Ellison explained
that, indeed, even British officers in Constantinople sold munitions and arms to the Turks for
£5,000 sterling.   At Ankara, Turks told Ellison, to her shock, “it is as easy ‘to buy’ one of our82
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officers as those of other nations, that they have done so over and over again in Constantinople . .
. . and paid £6,000 sterling for our men’s assistance to charter a boat and escape from Malta . .
.”   Though bribery and corruption are nothing new to any place in time, it was still an indication83
of the weak will behind the Allied policies in Turkey.
Ellison, like many of the Turks she encountered, attributed the success of the struggle to
the leadership inspiring it – in particular Ellison points out Mustafa Kemal and Halide Edib
Adivar.  At a residence that was formerly a command center for King Constantine, Ellison
recorded that the Turkish officers believed that since it appeared the King lived underground, this
show of fear meant he could not accomplish anything commanding the Greek army.  They stated,
“To be  fearless is a commandant’s first duty, and for that quality they were as ready to praise the
fallen Djémal and Enver as M. Kemal Pasha himself.”   Ellison noted of Mustafa Kemal that his84
genius “as military chief and civil organiser is unequalled”.   She was told by one of his generals85
after her interview with Kemal that, “No man could be more fearless, more hard on himself, or
kinder to his men. . . . when he leads them, the soldiers know all is well. ‘His star is good,’ . . . .
His mind works rapidly to clear decisions.  Above all, he never loses his head, and his judgment
is sound.”   Following her interviews and time in Ankara, Ellison points that his leadership86
ability is such that he had a dominating personality.  To his abilities and character, Ellison, likely
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summarizing from her interviews with Kemal, noted that he had seen the need to save his country
and begin preparing to do so during the tyranny of Sultan Abdul Hamid.87
Halide Edib, Ellison noted, was a brilliant woman, a sergeant in the Nationalist army, and
a chronicler of the Greek atrocities.  Putting her near the center of the movement, Ellison wrote
that Halide Edib “was first in the field against Abdul Hamid, one of the first to understand
Angora, to leave all for the Pasha, to work without ceasing for Nationalism and the new
Turkey.”   Ellison saw her as a courageous and influential woman, whose oration was inspiring88
and “set her hearers on fire”.   Such was her part in nationalism that Ellison claimed, “All89
Turkey’s great men have visited her . . . much of the destiny of her country has come to birth, if
not maturity, in her home.”   Noting Turks revered “her as their Joan of Arc,” Ellison declared90
Halide Edib to be among the central heroes of the Nationalist Struggle.91
Ellison claimed none could conquer Turkey because it had not truly been conquered
during the World War.  In conversation with an officer at the National Assembly in Ankara, she
suggested that the Turks had been horribly beaten in the Great War.  To that he replied, “‘Few of
the Powers were forced to scatter their forces along so many frontiers.  The English were
nowhere near Mosul,’ he went on, ‘and they never really broke up our army; they just took
possession of Constantinople and, through the Greeks, of Smyrna.  They taught us the fait
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accompli.’”   The soldiers of Turkey were not all beaten directly, they were scattered and many92
hiding as deserters.  As such, they had gathered ten thousand men by July 1920, the officer
claimed, and four hundred thousand by the end of 1922.  At the Conference of Lausanne, Ellison
observed that, “. . . we ask ourselves what nation was as badly beaten as Turkey?  Yet which of
our late enemies had dared such open defiance to the Allies?”   In her conclusion after the93
Conference, she noted that despite beating Turkey in the Great War, England could not (single-
handed) conquer her and as such there was no choice for Lord Curzon but to give in to the
Nationalists.
Grace Ellison dared to give voice for peace and understanding of her friend the Turk at a
time when most of the West still had difficulty imaging them as deserving independence and not
punishment.  Her work warned that the Allies could not afford to conquer Turkey – the citizens
of the West would not support it, and the Turks would fight to the very last death.  She sought to
explain how she saw the partitioning, Greek invasion, Allied occupation, and deportations had
galvanized the Anatolian Turks under the leadership of dominating personalities, like Mustafa
Kemal, to preserve their national homeland.
Ahmed E. Yalman:
Ahmed Emin Yalman was a Turkish nationalist, who both observed and participated in
the National Struggle as a journalist.  His words stressed the worldwide shock at the success of
the Nationalists: “there is hardly another instance of a nation which has so miraculously reversed
its role in the world in such a short span of time and by its own will and ingenuity”.94
Howard 25
Ibid., 3.95
Ibid., 108.96
Ibid., 105.97
Ibid., 19.98
Ibid., 20-21.99
Yalman pointed out that, from his point of view, “the great powers of the West, particularly
Russia, had done everything possible to speed the Sick Man’s death, but had not anticipated a
healthy heir turning up to foil their plans to partition Turkey among themselves”.   95
Ahmed Yalman was certainly biased in perspective despite his lifelong efforts to maintain
his role as a journalist.  In his writing, the Greek troops are undeniably “Greek invaders”  and96
many actions by the Allied Powers were treated as scandals.   Starting with his youth he grew up97
and studied in the same revolutionary environment of Salonika to which he attributed the
formation of Mustafa Kemal.  When he graduated from a German school in Istanbul in 1907,
however, he became a journalist – “the best possible post for observing conditions in the
country”.   Being an observer, though, did not eliminate his opinions.98
Yalman’s outlook on conditions was colored by his interactions with Young Turks,
Mustafa Kemal, Halide Edib Adivar, and other Nationalists.  Throughout 1907 and 1908, he had
close interaction with colleagues on the newspaper who were connected to secret Young Turkish
activities, and he stated, “From them I received the proper training for hating despotism in its
manifold forms.”   A 1908 teaching position in Istanbul also afforded him close association with99
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a Union and Progress leader, Ziya Gökalp.   These relations affected his outlook on the100
Ottoman government structure, which he viewed as having become “arbitrary and corrupt”.   101
For three and a half years starting in 1911, Yalman attended Columbia University
studying academic subjects and gaining exposure to American culture.  Going to student
conventions in Pennsylvania and Missouri, he gained insight into American and Christian
philosophies, which led him to want to try and teach nationalism to Turks in a manner similar to
how Americans had tried to teach him about Jesus (and convert him).   In 1919 after the102
Armistice, Yalman acted as a participant and not just an observer in matters pertaining to
American relations.  Along with Halide Edib, he actively promoted co-operation with American
experts and Wilsonian Principles.   103
As Turkey was being parceled and split apart, the United States was, as Turks saw it, “the
only country which brought a deep sympathy and understanding to the movement of regeneration
and independence in Turkey.”   Yalman watched with hope as “Through the publicity they gave104
to Turkey and Turkish problems, individual Americans, like Constantine Brown of the Chicago
Daily News and Clarence Streit of the Philadelphia Public Ledger, took active part in the Turkish
movement to regain independence.”   Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol became American105
high commissioner in Turkey.  Bristol was highly respected by Yalman for his “deep sense of
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justice” and because “His activities from the beginning to the end of our struggle for independent
national existence amounted, in effect, to almost an informal alliance between Turkey and the
United States.”106
Journalists may claim to be simply observers, but papers are businesses and need stories
to sell.  In 1920, he was mistakenly arrested with a large number of former Young Turks.  Seeing
that “the public was agog to know what was going on behind the prison walls”, he wrote his
impressions, which he called “one of the most successful scoops of my journalistic career.”   In107
the autumn of 1921, he smuggled articles from his Malta exile under the pseudonym “A Hermit”
in order to maintain the publication of his Istanbul paper.   These regular articles plus a108
“booklet about the whole Malta scandal” served as part of his efforts to promote nationalism.  109
In 1922, he also sought to “satisfy the wide-awake curiosity in Istanbul and elsewhere by
publishing the life story of the new national chief [Mustafa Kemal] in his own words” for the
purpose of furthering nationalist activity in Turkey.   Numerous times during the National110
Struggle, Yalman claimed to have been offered positions in Kemal’s government.  He turned
down these offers not to maintain an outside objectivity, but mainly believing he could do more
to promote the Nationalist cause as a journalist and publisher in Istanbul.  Yet, little of his major
account of events is in direct opposition to that of Grace Ellison or Halide Edib.
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With his extensive education and experience, Yalman chronicled the historical events
which prepared Turkey with the organization, culture, and spirit for nationalism and
independence.  Sultan Abdul Hamid created “two separate worlds inside” Turkey, wherein one of
them, people “despised the Sultan and secretly read books and papers written against him”.  111
Writers like Tevfik Fikret and Namik Kemal, Yalman explained, fostered “the spirit of revolt and
the dynamism preached in the patriotic poems”.   Yalman described the Young Turks before112
their successful revolution as having “kept fomenting the spirit of revolt in underground and
subversive activities.”   When the Young Turks took power from the Sultan, Yalman reported113
that “A general craze for self-expression seemed to spring up.  Everyone was inclined to
celebrate the ‘end of the nightmare of despotism and oppression’ by speaking and writing
prolifically.”   These foundations of revolution and subversion and general hatred of oppressive114
rule carried over to the National Struggle.
According to Yalman, Turkish nationalism relied upon the desire to save native pride and
heritage.  He stated that to his former colleague, “Ziya Gökalp, more than to any other man,
belongs the credit of producing both historical facts and the inspiration to revive native pride in
the early traditions of Turkish culture and constructive Turkish rule.”   Yalman connected that115
same pride saved by Gökalp to that which Mustafa Kemal used to unite the Turks.  During the
Young Turk years (1908-1918), Ziya Gökalp and a group of powerful Union and Progress
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members used their power to institute particular “fundamental reforms”.   However, the reform116
was not enough under the Young Turks for the nation to survive.  Yalman noted “Yet war
weakness and confusion and corruption prevented any consistent progress.”   As the World War117
ended, Yalman described the Empire as being “in a most self-critical mood”.118
At that point, Yalman believed a new Turkey required a stronger, more progressive leader
and radical change.  For this reason it was significant that for Yalman to observe that “The
irrationality of the unpatriotic government in Istanbul was bringing the Turkish patriots close
every day to open revolt.  They were fast becoming ardent nationalists, not . . . against foreigners,
but in the fundamental sense of anti-imperialism.”   Where the corruption of the Ottoman119
dynasty had led in the past to the nationalist support for the Young Turks, the corruption of the
current government, which was “irrationally” collaborating with the Allies in Istanbul by carrying
out their policies through its orders, was creating resentment and inspiring renewed nationalism. 
Yalman watched as the governing powers were unable to respond; “More resentment than could
escape through minor safety valves had welled up in Anatolia and had been channeled into the
Association for the Defense of Asiatic and European Turkey.”   The leader of the Association120
was Mustafa Kemal, who then formed the National Assembly in Ankara.  This new government,
which became “the de facto power in Turkey, went to war against the Greek invaders”.   121
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Yalman believed in the strength of the national spirit fueling the resistance.  Like Grace
Ellison, he also provided a story of surprising will to sacrifice.  Halide Edib’s husband (at the
time), Dr. Adnan was weak and in bad health, but Yalman wrote that Adnan refused demands of
his friends to rest by replying, “‘Our individual lives are too unimportant compared with the
national task ahead of us.  If I stop working and start thinking about myself, I shall feel that I am
dying morally and it will be immaterial how soon physical death follows.’”   Much like122
Ellison’s mother protecting munitions from the cold, Dr. Adnan exemplified the powerful
national spirit of dedication to the cause over the individual self.  
During the World War, Yalman had worked as a war correspondent on the German fronts
in Europe.  Seeing the Germans and Russians at Warsaw, Yalman had concluded that “. . . men
and materials are not the chief factors in a fight. The will to fight and skill in the high command
are the main factors”.   Returning from Malta exile, he visited the new Turkish front and was123
astonished by the dedication and national spirit of Kemal’s army.  The soldiers were “superior in
spirit” to the best he had seen of the Germans.   To explain the benefits of this, he wrote, “The124
officers’ and soldiers’ vitality and initiative could be attributed to the spirit of love and sacrifice
engendered to protect their own homes and freedom”.   Yalman described a level of125
commitment and will that sounds much like that exaggerated spirit described by Nogales. 
However, in contrast to the stark courage of the troops described under Nogales’
leadership, Yalman contends these nationalist soldiers were less dedicated during the prior war. 
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The soldiers told Yalman, they had felt alienated as the prior war dragged on leaving them
suffering for lands and peoples speaking different language, but at this time “‘we all know what
we are fighting for. . . . When we are wounded, we are impatient to get back to the front.’”  126
Desertion had been a growing problem for the Ottoman army, but the rise of desertions as World
War I turned against the Ottoman Empire may have saved the Turks.  To substantiate the
argument that wholesale desertions preserved the necessary able-bodies for the struggle for
independence, Yalman quoted a French miliary expert, “As Larcher rightly observes, ‘The
Turkish nation saved itself from total destruction by deserting [during World War I].’”   Many127
of these deserters were now a fresh and dedicated part of the nationalist army led by officers
hand-picked carefully from volunteers of the ‘defeated’ World War I army.
The British lacked the support among officials to enforce their policies and keep Turkey a
subject nation.  This fact is best illustrated by Yalman’s recounting of the debacle required for
them to arrest him.  The Acting Commander of Istanbul, Colonel Fehmi, was ordered to exile
him, but instead told Yalman, “‘I do not take my orders from him [the minister of the interior],
and I am not willing to carry out illegal orders even from my military superiors.  So I release you
to go wherever you like.’”   From the local director of the police in Eskiºehir, who released him128
a second time, he learned that the governor and all officials below him were in the patriotic camp
and defying the orders from Istanbul to exile him.   Many Turks were finding passages to129
escape arrest and exile.  Yalman mentioned that Admiral Bristol even approached him offering to
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help.  However, Yalman, despite having evaded the corrupt Istanbul governments orders for his
arrest and exile, chose to seek the British for his arrest and informed worried acquaintances, “‘. . .
I am searching for a British authority competent to arrest me.’”   Being taken to Malta, “The130
Admiral [Hope of the Cardiff], in sincere indignation, made a single comment at the end: ‘They
say we British are stupid.  We really are.’”   Additionally, his guard on the ship told Yalman,131
“‘You may tip Greek waiters in Istanbul on your return. I have done only my duty, and I have felt
ashamed to keep you always under guard.’”   The British officers lacked conviction in the132
policies to suppress the Turks; what chance did the Allies have in enforcing the terms of peace?
From Yalman’s informed perspective as a journalist and participant, the actual policies of
the Allies were poorly designed and completely worked against maintaining their interests and
influence in Turkey.  Yalman, a man with a mastery of dramatic language, appraised the actions
of the Allies and the result as such:
These powers met no resistance in occupying Turkey militarily and were in no
mood to show any degree of leniency.  Still, those very victors acted with such
disregard of facts, used means contrary to their own purpose, that the lethargic
kinfolk around the Sick Man’s deathbed, themselves infected by enough poisons
and germs to cause a natural death, were stimulated to fresh vitality, regained their
will to survive, accumulated fresh energy, and miraculously recovered a national
health which soon exceeded that of the conquerors. . . . It was really a rare drama,
showing how far human stupidity can go . . .133
Yalman had seen in Belgium during World War I, that the Germans understood how to limit
their exploitation “by the cultural consciousness and unseen resistance of the conquered people
themselves.  The Germans behaved well in Belgium, as I judged not only by my observations
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there, but also in comparison with what I saw of the Inter-Allied occupation in Turkey after the
Armistice.”   The Allies failed to provide sufficient safety valves in Turkey and pushed their134
methods to such a point of humiliation that “. . . it was brought home to every Turk that he could
lose no more, and that he must do something to defend himself, if he was at least to die with
honor and not miserably.”   The Allied Powers misjudged the situation: they missed the135
“sweeping social changes” that had occurred in Turkey and “obtained their information indirectly
and from biased sources.”   He pointed out that the British psychologically could not detect the136
dangers of the situation and would not have believed the facts even if presented with them.   As137
a result, Yalman made the claim that the Allies had done the most to bring about national
unification.
The 14 May 1919 entry of Greek troops was certainly a grand mistake of policy.  The
invasion and actions of Greek forces “gave rise to a universal storm of indignation in Turkey.”  138
Then the March 1920 Constantinople occupation greatly aided the Nationalists.  Those ‘illegally’
arrested and sent to Malta were made “into martyrs and heroes”  (even those formerly hated for139
their part in the Young Turk government), and it’s complicity finally and completely discredited
the Sultan’s government.   The occupation itself genuinely advanced Mustafa Kemal’s efforts140
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because some of his truest sympathizers now had the motivation to leave the comfortable
lifestyle of Istanbul for Ankara and the interior of Anatolia.
Among the Allies, Yalman saw jealousies and a lack of cooperation.  Analyzing the
events, Yalman concluded that “Great Britain seemed to want to neglect some obligations of the
secret treaties so far as France and Italy were concerned, and to secure for itself, under the guise
of a Greek invasion of the western parts of Asia Minor, the dominant position in the Near
East.”   All four of these Allied nations sought to advance their own position and increase their141
share of the spoils in the Near East, a situation resulting in “. . . rivalries, jealousies, and intrigues
[that] sprang up among the occupying Allied Powers almost from the first day.”   Initially, all142
the powers did agree fully on crushing Turkish society and spirit.  France secretly offered support
to the Nationalists, but was carrying out unreliable, “double-faced policy” (until the Nationalist
army forced the French to withdraw).  Likewise, “The Italians were trying to make friends and
gain influence with the Turks while waiting the chance to get their share of war spoils . . .”  143
When the French withdrew from southern Turkey in October 1921, they had “. . . left us the bulk
of their ammunition and equipment, partly perhaps in pique at the British dominance instead of
the partnership envisioned in the secret treaties to partition Turkey . . .”  (In spite of the144
jealousies, Yalman, like Ellison, could not give any validation to rumors that British and French
officers were secretly fighting indirectly by leading behind Greek and Turkish lines, respectively. 
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These rumors were spread by the two armies, especially the Greeks, who could not believe their
opponents were so capable of acting alone.)
Yalman expressed a typical Turkish point of view of hopelessness about saving the
independence of Turkey in May 1919.  He explained that, “[t]he end of the world had come as far
as we Turks were concerned”, and “. . . ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ were becoming irritating
clichés”.   Then suddenly Mustafa Kemal declared his official resistance, which came as an145
unexpected “ray of hope.”  Despite this news, the cynical view left Yalman with a lot of doubts
that were dispelled by the fact that Kemal was no ordinary man.
Yalman credited Kemal with having achieved personal growth under pressure and being
the perfect type of person to lead a nation against unbeatable odds.  Mustafa Kemal, like Yalman,
had been influenced by the revolutionary and “extremely stimulating atmosphere” of Salonika.  146
Describing his dominating personality, Yalman called Kemal “a huge force by himself” and “a
unique conductor” of social energy.   He had become a war hero and had a reputation for147
success — “. . . Mustafa Kemal was a man of great prestige, the leader who had been responsible
for the victory over the British at Gallipoli on the Dardanelles and the only commander who had
kept his army intact and undefeated during the final disintegration.”   Yalman saw the change148
from hopelessness to success less than two years after 1919, and wrote, “. . . I found it easy to
grasp the fact that the will power, the vision, and the courage of a clear-sighted leader was the
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immediate source of this miracle.”   Unlike other desperate Turkish patriots, Kemal, Yalman149
said, wanted to secure “their full heritage” rather than just try to salvage what they could.
Throughout his life, Yalman made it clear that he sought to prove Auguste Comte’s
prediction that the most extensive changes in the world would come through Turkey (and
Russia).  While advancing his own career, he encouraged nationalism and demands for a Turkey
without foreign interference.  He was convinced of the commanding personality of Mustafa
Kemal and Halide Edib, as Ellison had come to be.  Like Ellison, he became well aware that the
individual British soldiers did not have conviction in conquering the Turks.  Yalman felt the
strong emotions – that desire for liberty at the cost of death – that Ellison had attempted to
explain.
Arnold J. Toynbee:
Professor Arnold J. Toynbee was a British historian.  During the first World War,
Toynbee worked under the direction of the British government in various department, always on
Turkish affairs.  In 1915-1916, he edited the government’s official ‘Treatment of Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire: 1915.’  “Afterwards I worked, always on Turkish affairs, in the Intelligence
Bureau of the Department of Information (May 1917 to May 1918); in the Political Intelligence
Department of the Foreign Office (May to December 1918); and in the Foreign Office section of
the British Delegation to the Peace Conference at Paris (December 1918 to April 1919).”  150
Starting in 1919, Professor Toynbee was elected the first holder of the Koraís Chair of Byzantine
and Modern Greek Language, Literature, and History, in the University of London.  While
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holding this Chair, he took advantage of the opportunity to travel to the Near East so that, he
could see “. . . all that I could of the situation from both the Greek and the Turkish point of view .
. .”   In his The Western Question, Toynbee offered his notes, impressions, observations, and151
arguments concerning the troubles in the Near East, particularly the Turkish Nationalist Struggle.
Toynbee, a scholar, was not without bias nevertheless.  (Historians since have criticized
the manner by which he made world histories for his focus on religion and mythology.)  During
his own education, he had received what he later referred to as “a Renaissance education in
Hellenism.”   Yet, on Turkish affairs, Toynbee provided a clear voice of two views of the152
Turks.  Prior to his trip from 15 January 1921 to 16 September 1921 to the Greek and Turkish
lands, the professor held a pro-Hellenic, anti-Turk view that was not untypical for Western
Europeans during the World War.  Of his work on the treatment of Armenians, he stated that he
had “. . . incidentally learnt, I believe, nearly all that there is to be learnt to the discredit of the
Turkish nation and of their rule over other peoples.”   In The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks,153
a response to President Wilson’s concerns written on behalf of the British and Entente
Governments, he noted, “This maiming and warping of more gifted peoples is in itself a capital
indictment of Turkish domination, but the wrong is made infinitely worse by the outrageous
methods by which it has been carried out.”   His early opinions of the Turkish nation and154
people are a result of his participation in war-propaganda of highly negative stereotypes.  In
Turkey: A Past, and a Future 1917, he assaulted Turkey with the premise that “Turkey, which
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claims the present in Western Asia, is nothing but an overthrow of the past and an obstruction of
the future.”155
After his first-hand observations of the people and events at work, his opinion became
more balanced and critical of the Greeks and Entente leaders.  The Koraís Chair had been created
essentially by the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos.  Toynbee’s writing and vocal criticism of
Greek actions from the position, thus, caused great controversy.  Following the end of his initial
term, July 1924, he resigned.   As Ahmed Emin Yalman noted, “This publicity cost Professor156
Toynbee the chair of Byzantine history, and he was without a position for some time; but he
never expressed regret for this price he had to pay for truthful reporting.”157
Furthermore, in the pursuit of truthful accounting, he assured his readers that no bribes
have ever been offered to him – taking great offense at a Major Melas accusation to the contrary. 
The controversy over The Western Question, Toynbee summarized by quoting, 
‘Propagandists, whether Turkish or Greek,’ writes another reviewer, ‘will find in
one half of his book cause for lavish praise and in the other ground for bitter
contradiction.  But when he comes to study the causes of this ghastly problem of
the Near East, Professor Toynbee has, for both Turk and Greek, sympathy rather
than blame.  Both are the victims, he would say, of our Western civilisation. 
Therein lies the explanation of his rather puzzling title.’158
In the second edition of the book, Toynbee added in several footnotes to explain that his original
opinion was incorrect or had changed.  He refused to make conclusions and judgments in
situations where he did not have enough first hand knowledge or had too many conflicting
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accounts.  Toynbee possessed practical and political Turkish-language ability (apparently lacking
“narrative” abilities to discuss such things as Tolstoy).159
“The whole concept of European influence and Ottoman reaction owes a debt to
Toynbee’s ‘challenge and response’” approach.   According to this theoretical approach, a160
civilization had to face the stimulus of a challenge and respond in order to develop.   In his161
chapter, “The Shadow of the West,” he claimed that “Whenever one analyses a contemporary
movement . . . in these societies, it nearly always turns out to be either a response to or a reaction
against some Western stimulus.”   This approach offered good insights into the historical162
events, but suffered from a sense of Western superiority.  One of the larger problems, in the Near
East, according to Toynbee is the sudden apathy and indifference from the West toward the East. 
The interest during the World War gave way to domestic post-war concerns.  Yet, the Greeks and
Turks insisted, he observed, that the powerful effects from Western action “must be the result of
policy”; they could not believe that it was “unintentional and unconscious” by the Western
nations.  To communicate how little the Near East concerned citizens of England, Toynbee told
Greeks and Turks that the British were “almost apathetic about the violent disturbances which
were then taking place in Ireland”.163
The British and Entente powers, argued Toynbee, suffered numerous misjudgments.   The
British thought there might be an alliance between the Bolsheviks in Russia and the Nationalists
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of Turkey.  As a result they were treating the Nationalists hostilely even though, Toynbee
believed, both supposed ‘enemies’ had “shown themselves anxious to come to terms with one or
all of the Allies . . .”   The decision to allow the Greeks to occupy Western Anatolia with troops164
was one of the grander mistakes made after the World War.  Toynbee referred to it as “wanton
rashness” because even “. . . after the experiment had proved a failure, it showed blind prejudice
and partiality on the part of Western Governments that they should continue to give Greece
material and moral support . . .”165
The outlook of the Entente Powers was poorly designed according to Toynbee.  They
viewed players in the Near East as pawns.  A correspondent of the Times reported from Istanbul
on 10 October 1921, Toynbee recorded, “‘The policy . . . of backing the protagonists (sic) in the
present Eastern War as if they were race-horses, is a policy of which each of the Entente Powers
in turn has been guilty, and must be abandoned if peace is ever to be restored in the Levant.’”
One of the main problems with this view is that it prevented the Entente Powers from properly
understanding the consequences of their policies.  For example, Toynbee wrote, 
The Greek Army was so immediately convenient that British statesmen ignored
the fact that its presence in Anatolia had really created the hostile movement
which it showed such obliging readiness to combat, and the still more serious fact
that this movement was potentially stronger than the force which had called it into
being.166
All the Greeks were in agreement, from Toynbee’s observations, that Lloyd George and Great
Britain would fully support them.  It was his contention that the “will to war” for both Greece
and Turkey was maintained by these misjudgments of Western backing.  Compromise could have
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been reached had between Turkey and Greece if they had been convinced there would be no
more support from stronger Western powers.167
The plans made by the Entente Powers in their secret agreements relied upon the belief
that the men and money at their disposal during the World War would remain at their service. 
However, both the soldiers and taxpayers rose against continued waste of men and resources to
implement these plans for the Near East.  While the people of the Near East believed, claimed
Toynbee, that they possessed a stronger “will to live,” in actuality, it was simply the British,
French and Italian peoples deciding to preserve their resources.   Toynbee asserted that there168
existed three options to dealing with the Greeks in Western Anatolia — thorough segregation,
restoring the status quo, and carving out Greek territory.  This chosen, third option, he claimed,
combined the disadvantages of the other two.   Toynbee believed a status quo could have been169
restored — that there did not have to be such intense violence between the national groups. 
Having seen atrocities, he still wrote, “Even after what had happened, I found personal links
between Anatolian Greeks and Turks still holding at Manysa and Armudlu in 1921.  If the Greek
troops had never landed, assuredly the breach could have been healed and the status quo
restored.”   Instead, however, the Greek troops had landed and “national hostility and disdain”170
grew to such levels that Greek troops refused to learn any Turkish even after nine months.171
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The occupying Entente greatly misjudged the Turks, their local organizations, and
leaders.  Toynbee’s explanation of how the Allied Powers at Constantinople saw fit to entrust
Mustafa Kemal with the power and position of an inspector-general of the Ottoman forces is
indeed an interesting tale in foolish assumption-making.  According to him, Kemal had achieved
such success in war as to make Enver Pasha, the Young Turk Minister of War, jealous.  Enver,
by attempting to keep him in the background, made Kemal “a popular figure—a soldier with a
fine record who had been persecuted by the men responsible for the national disaster.”   As a172
result, “Just because he was known to be a personal opponent of Enver, the tame government
kept by the Allied Powers at Constantinople let him loose in Anatolia (with the approval of the
Allied military authorities) . . . a few weeks after the landing of the Greek troops at Smyrna.”  173
Furthermore, Toynbee argued that “by favouring, on transparent diplomatic pretexts, the claimant
to legitimacy who happened to be under our thumb, we were only strengthening his [the Sultan’s]
rivals.”174
Toynbee attempted to forewarn the Entente Powers that their internal rivalries in the East
were a threat to any policy regarding the Near East.  “. . .the ancient Anglo-French rivalry in the
East was not only still in full vigour, but . . .  it was one of the dominant and most dangerous
factors in the present situation.”   Toynbee detailed the various rivalries between the Western175
and Entente nations.  Additionally, he chronicled the particular Anglo-French rivalry as having
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roots in the sixteenth century and abiding only as each Power had been consumed with rivalries
with Germany until the War ended.176
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire reawakened the rivalries between Britain and France
as Ottoman “intervention in the War removed all restraint on Western appetites.”   The agreed177
upon policies were not mutually, equally beneficial to the Powers.  France saw no relief from
Britain’s use of Greece against Turkey.  In fact, the use of the Greeks only caused the Turkish
Nationalists to become too much of a threat and burden for the French to handle.   On 20178
October 1921 with the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement between Ankara and France, the French
Zone in southeastern Turkey was abandoned.  Each Power was backing different nations against
one another to better position themselves – Britain backing Greece against Turkey; France,
Turkey; Italy, Turkey; Russia, Turkey; and Russia backing Armenian Erivan against Turkey and
Azerbaijan.   Toynbee declared that “. . . a French policy took shape for using Turkey against179
Russia in much the same way as Mr. Lloyd George was already using Greece against Turkey.”  180
Indeed, because each Power expected to gain and improve their prospects by manipulating “their
pawns against each other” nothing came of peace-making attempts.181
The Greeks entered Turkey because the British government believed that it could carry
out its war-aims through the Greeks.  The 15 May 1919 landing of Greeks at Smyrna ruined,
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Toynbee posited, the Allies future of effectively controlling Anatolia.  As there had been no prior
local disorder, the landing was in contrast to the armistice signed the prior October.  The
description of events offered by Toynbee made the decision seem quite foolish.  Supposedly,
even in remote areas, Turkish authorities were obeying orders and both disarming and
disbanding.  As basis for this claim and the consequence of the Greek landing, Toynbee
recounted that:
It was given to me in 1921 by an Englishman who in May 1919 had been Allied
control-officer in the town of X.  Up to the end of May, he had been conducting
the local process of disarmament without difficulty, though he had no troops with
him and indeed no assistants but a couple of orderlies and clerks. . . . [After
hearing for a couple days from locals that the Greeks had landed troops in
Smyrna.]  Then the British officer wired urgently to his own chiefs to learn the
truth, and eight days later received for the first time from them the information
which had already reached him through every other channel.  But his orders were
already ceasing to be obeyed.  The Turkish authorities were re-arming and drilling
their men, and when he was eventually recalled to Constantinople, he was lucky to
escape detention.182
The Turkish regulars in Western Anatolia, according to Toynbee, after ceasing to disarm and
disband, began to grow from the reduced sub-20,000 man force into a formidable organization
again.  While the army was reorganized, chettes, professional brigands, took on the responsibility
of resisting the Greek forces.
This new war that began between the Greeks and Turks caused a great deal of destruction. 
Toynbee was witness to destruction of buildings and homes that had been done deliberately, not
as the result of warfare.  On both sides, atrocities were committed.  He saw gardens where
Greeks had been slaughtered wholesale.   Similarly, he claimed to have records of numerous183
murders, beatings, violations, abuse, and other violence against Turks by Greek gendarmes and
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soldiers.   The chettes (Turkish meaning armed brigands) often themselves looted those areas184
that they were supposedly ‘defending.’  Regarding these events, Toynbee stated one thing in
particular: “In judging Greek and Turkish atrocities, Westerners have no right to be self-
righteous.  They can only commit one greater error of judgment, and that is to suppose that the
Turks are more unrighteous than the Greeks.”185
Chronicling the foundations of Turkish Nationalism, Toynbee stated that the development
was natural as nationalism had been spreading from the West for a century.  Like other writers,
Toynbee noted the importance of nationalist literary and lingual development; “The translation of
foreign masterpieces as an incentive to a new national literature was in the programme of Ziya
Bey’s society, the Yeni Hayat (New Life).   He also credited the defeat of the Ottomans as186
liberation for nationalism.  Like Yalman, he noted that by freeing Turkey of the “alien
provinces” , the home-land could be strengthened and focused upon.  In contrast to other187
observers studied here, Toynbee was less concerned with the dominating personality of single
Turkish figures as the sole saviors of Turkey.  He wrote, “. . . any selection of names must be
arbitrary, for it is no exaggeration to say that, in some place and in some capacity, every Osmanli
of character and energy became a worker for the national cause . . .”   Toynbee noted that the188
strength of nationalism was so potent that in Constantinople, under occupation by the Allied
Powers and with only half the population being Turkish, the Porte’s grand viziers had to become
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more Nationalist in order to be tolerated.   When even the occupying powers had to defer to189
Turkish feelings, the influence of the nationalist movement was clearly evident.
Arnold Toynbee saw the Turkish National Struggle from the Greek and European side. 
He was not able to travel to Ankara and behind the Turkish lines, and yet, he became
disillusioned with the philhellenic views that had been so common in Britain.  From Toynbee’s
account of the history, the Entente leaders evidently had a very poor understanding of the Near
East’s situation.  Britain attempted to use the Greeks and other peoples of the Near East for their
own designs, but failed to realize soon enough that a strong military and leadership force
remained in Anatolia even though the Ottoman Empire had collapsed.  Toynbee believed that the
poor intelligence and selfish rivalries among the Entente Powers turned the peoples of the Near
East (e.g., Greeks, Turks, Armenians . . . ) all into victims – creating the “Western Question.”
Halide Edib Adivar:
Halide Edib Adývar  was a leading Turkish nationalist, a writer (a novelist and a190
translator), orator, and even a corporal in the Turkish Nationalist army during the war with
Greece.  She was a member of a fairly well to do family, and as such, she attended foreign
schools in Turkey.  In 1893 or 1894, she began to learn intensive English at the American
College for Girls.   Through her family’s position and her education, she ended up meeting and191
befriending many Turkish intellectuals – Young Turks and future nationalists.  In her memoirs,
she credited Hamdi Effendi, a friend of early martyrs of liberty and an opponent of the sultan,
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with her early notions of liberty.   As a child, Noury Bey, a founder of the Young Turk192
movement, was a great friend of hers.   Thus, from a young age, Halide grew to despise the193
sultan, the “despot destroying all who try to give happiness and freedom to the Turkish
people,”  and that she saw the palatial estates at Yildiz as “vain and wrong exhibitions of194
power”195
As a participant in the Turkish National Struggle and also prior nationalist and political
organizations, Halide Edib was no doubt biased in her accounts and allocation of blame.  She
was nearly elected as a member of the Nationalist Parliament in the 1919 election, but the
Constitution at the time did not allow for women members.   She also volunteered to join the196
Turkish regulars as a corporal with general responsibilities for the maintenance of order.  She
would have attended the Conference at Lausanne had her health allowed it.   As Toynbee197
concurred with her own claim, Halide was “one of the pioneers of the modern movement in
Turkey for the emancipation of women . . . and an apostle of ‘Pan-Turanianism.’”  198
Given her life, it is no surprise that she was unable to be objectively balanced in her
memoirs.  Due to events and her sense of national honor, her writing was quite hostile to the
Entente Powers.  She credited the Powers with making the Treaty of Sèvres, “the intended death-
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warrant of Turkey”.   In her lectures, later in life, she made the stereotyping decision to explain199
the differences between the Western mind of materialism and the Eastern mind of “moral and
spiritual values”.   As another instance of bias, readers should note that, by no means, does she200
give equal treatment to atrocities committed in the Near East – not by denying cruelty or
massacres done by Turks but rather by mostly avoiding their mention.  She mentioned the
massacre of Armenians mainly only in a display of how upset Turkish nationalists were when
Armenians and Turks were not blamed evenly.   She also accused Armenian writer Leon201
Milikoff of “prejudice” in his book (La Révolution Russe), but yet herself called his book “the
first expression of a constructive Armenian point of view . . .”   It would seem probable that she202
too was suffering from some prejudice to argue that this sole book was the first example of a
constructive Armenian work.
Her emotions toward the Greeks were such that she referred to them as “murderers, the
so-called civilizing Greek army.”   She described the Greek landing in western Anatolia by203
depicting the Turks as being tied sheep, and the Entente “offered them bound to the knife of the
Greek army.”   Further, she declared the view that the consequences “brought out all that was204
finest in the Turk and all that was basest in the Greek.”   However, Halide did admit that due to205
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censorship, the Greek atrocities were transmitted by rumors, which “became more serious and
probably more exaggerated.”   (It is unlikely that stories of Turkish babies being roasted for206
meals were true.)  Yet, she was well-educated in Western culture and was observing on the spot. 
She provided first-hand accounts that a visitor such as Grace Ellison or Professor Toynbee could
not provide.
Halide Edib in her memoirs and lectures tracked the history of the gradual foundation of
Turkish nationalism.  Examining the folk history of the Turkish people, Halide recounted that in
an old tale of the ancient land of the Turks, “Uttuken [Ötüken],” “there are no such things [as
gold, wines, and silks of China that ‘soften’ people], but there is Freedom.”   Breaking the207
Persian and Arabic chains binding Ottoman language, “which could only express medieval
thought,” individuals such as Shinassi, Namik Kemal, and Riza Tewfik, said Halide, had created
a new medium in the language that could express new thoughts from the West.   Halide208
contended that political supremacy was not as great a power as ‘art,’ and “. . . once it has gained
sway, it cannot be dethroned from the public heart”.   Tanzimatists promoted individual liberty209
as their greatest message, with Namik Kemal as a beloved man who made liberty a cult.  Halide
reported that “There has never been any other figure in the history of Turkish thought and politics
who has been and is still as much worshiped by the Turkish public.”   The Tanzimat reformers,210
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Halide argued, “laid the foundation of new Turkey, and made it possible for the Turkish element
to rise and create a state over the debris of the empire in spite of world opposition.”211
The Turkish people, Halide noted, thought the occupation by the Entente forces after the
30 October 1918 armistice would only be temporary until a peace was signed.  However, as she
viewed it, “the sight of a disarmed Turkey with all its internal desolation and helplessness at once
revived the age-old appetites” of the Western Powers.   As Toynbee had also highlighted,212
Halide Hanoum noted the competing interests of the West in the resources of the East, writing,
“In short, from the end of the seventeenth century until the end of the nineteenth . . . we see the
Great Powers of the West constantly discussing methods of disposing of the ‘Sick Man’s’
goods.”   Again, Halide represented another observer of the Entente governments, who felt they213
were treating the people of the Near East as “horses at a race” and “no more than pawns, to be
played against each other in the game of furthering European interests . . .”   Turkey, she said,214
looked like a losing horse.
The occupation by Entente powers following the armistice caused additional social
tension.  According to Halide, the Greek and Armenian citizens of Constantinople acted horribly
toward Turks; Turkish women and children were verbally assaulted and pushed out of tramcars,
for example, she claimed.   Halide responded to the Turkish treatment of Armenians by215
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suggesting that “On the whole the Allies treated Armenians worse than Turks”  by encouraging,216
subsidizing, arming them, and promising a state they knew never would come.  
The British headquarters was actually wishing for a violent and bloody fray
between the Turks and the Christians, according to those reports [brought in by
Major Kemaleddine Sami], and so of course it was to their advantage to let us
throttle each other so that they could be given a pretext to occupy Istamboul in the
name of peace.  Perhaps it was really true that they were arming the poor Christian
quarters . . .217
Some of the reports may have been exaggerations, but in any case, Turkish resentment against
foreign interference was growing.  Halide recorded that when the Allies did officially occupy
Constantinople, it did not require direct bloodshed, but it had violent consequences from “stirring
up the Turks to offer the utmost resistance.”   From that moment, Halide and others became218
fully committed to eventually ending the Sultanate because the sultan was selling the Turks to the
foreigners (depriving Turks of their freedom and independence) through complicity with the
Entente.219
Halide Edib declared that the Greek landing at Smyrna (Izmir) caused the necessary
changes in the Turkish people to push the Nationalist movement toward success and
independence.  At the American College for Girls, she had seen a Jewish girl with an ever fearful
face that expected a blow to come.  Halide attributed this expression to “the unconscious mark of
a persecuted race,” and after the Armistice, “wondered in horror whether the Turkish race would
come to have it too and how many years it would take to give the proud face of the Turk that
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piteous aspect”.   The Greek landing created anger and disgust not just at the Greeks but at the220
Entente Powers who consented and watched the atrocities from their warships.  Further due to
bias and censorship, she claimed, no voices were raised in protest and no true account of the
landing appeared in the western press, which “. . . . combined to sink Turkish opinion of western
standards of morality and humanity far below zero.”  Halide contended that the lack of a moral
criticism or accountability caused the Greeks to carry on their robbery, arson, massacre, and
violations of Turkish men, women, and children – “their system of extermination” – onward into
Anatolia as their military advanced.221
This fear of “extermination” spread quickly among Turks.  Halide marked the change in
Turks as “instantaneous.”  Immediately, as Toynbee’s reports had noted, they stopped disarming
and began to react.   Explaining this movement, Halide wrote “. . . there is one thing which the222
world must never forget.  The reaction came first from the people itself.  All over the country
vast meetings were held to protest against the action of the Allies. . .”   The spirit of the Turks223
was invigorated and inspired by the horrible events.  The Greek atrocities created, as Halide
described it, “the psychology of despair and the determination of the people to die fighting rather
than to allow themselves to be slaughtered like a flock of sheep.”   Halide and her fellow Turks224
were willing to achieve successful independence at the cost of any sacrifices.  If they were being
told that Greeks and Christians were exterminating their innocent disarmed people and towns,
Howard 53
Edib, Turkey, 92.225
Ibid., 141.226
Edib, The Turkish Ordeal, 23.227
then they were hearing that they had nothing to lose and every hope to gain by fighting a new
war.
The Entente Powers failed to realize that the Nationalists’ and patriots’ revolutionary
spirit had already survive through suppression of Abdülhamid.  No longer was the sultanate
whom the Entente supported admired by the Turkish people.  Former nationalists had lived
when, “So greatly did Abdul-Hamid fear the spirit of the Turks that he even had the words,
“Liberty,” “Constitution,” and “Fatherland” erased from the dictionaries.”   The suffering under225
the Entente was nothing particularly new for Turkish nationalism to once again rise against and
overcome.  Enough Nationalist leaders were confident that the size of the enemy army could not
defeat them as the resistance in Gallipoli during the World War had been “accomplished more by
the Turk’s whole-hearted determination to survive than by any desire on his part for military
glory,” and it had “clearly shown that, when there is a question of Turkey’s survival, the
combined armaments of the most efficient Powers are of no avail against her”.   From their226
sacrifices, Halide argued, Turkish people became entirely dedicated to their cause and nation.
The dedication of the Turkish spirit to national independence was more clear in Halide’s
own words than those repeated by Grace Ellison.  She directly declared, “What we wanted was
very simple and it did not matter how and when we got it.  Every detail of the coming struggle
was of the utmost importance and worth any sacrifice we were willing to make.  And we were
willing.”   There was essentially nothing else aside from the struggle to push out the Greek227
invaders.  Once she became a completely dedicated Nationalist, she wrote, “Nothing mattered to
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me from that moment to the time of the extraordinary march to Smyrna in 1922.  I suddenly
ceased to exist as an individual: I worked, wrote, and lived as a unit of that magnificent national
madness.”   From Istanbul to Ankara the Nationalists had a secret staff of telegraph officials228
maintaining a telephone system for no return other than the success of the movement.   This229
mindset and dedication explains why Mustafa Kemal had told Ellison that to defeat Turkish
Nationalism every Turk would have to be killed.
In both of her memoirs, Halide Edib takes care to explain the Turkish drama Karakeuz. 
While the Turks were being laughed at or insulted by other races after the Armistice, they were
far more aware of the situation than their opponents realized.  
. . . Karakeuz personifies the Turk. . . . surrounded with endless difficulties.  Every
other personified race . . . bully him, assault him, attack him, use him for their
own purposes, and if necessary occasionally flatter him to make him serve their
purposes all the more.  Anyone watching the play says, “That fellow cannot
survive,” but when the last act comes everybody else is defeated and thwarted
while Karakeuz stands and grins after escaping from every possible difficult
situation.230
Halide’s observations, like all those previously mentioned, of the Struggle credited the Allied
forces with underestimating the Turks.  Within this play, Halide suggested, the enemies of
Turkey could have seen that attempts to partition, exterminate, or use the Turks as pawns, could
not and would not succeed.
A. A. Pallis:
Alexander A. Pallis was a Greek official and patriot during the conflicts of the Near East
between Greece and Turkey, as well as between Greece and the Entente, and among the Greeks
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themselves.  (Outside of his political career, he wrote on Alexander the Great, the Turkish
traveler Evliya Chelebi, Greek politics, and Greece’s role in the World War.)  In Greece’s
Anatolian Venture—and After, Pallis attempted to present, as fairly as he could, the positions of
Greece and the effects of events upon the nation.  For his own part, “at the time when the final
break between Venizelos and Constantine took place (Sept. 1916), [Pallis] occupied a post in the
Greek Administration in Macedonia and was one of the first officials to take service with the
Revolutionary Government set up by Venizelos . . .”   231
As to his bias, Pallis directly admitted to potential tendency toward bias but claimed to
write as fairly and accurately as was possible for him.  He wrote, “I can naturally make no claim,
any more than any other contemporary, to be regarded as a perfectly impartial witness.  My bias .
. . is bound to be in favour of the side I happened to back and with whose policy . . . I, in the
main, agreed.”   However, Pallis encouraged readers to check his sources.  He aimed to also232
treat Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine honestly despite having been a
supporter of Venizelos.  When he mentioned Mustafa Kemal, Pallis claimed that Venizelos’s
reputation as statesman was as great as that of Kemal.  In this way, the short praise he gave of
Kemal’s qualities was indirect praise to his own leader.  Yet, Pallis argued “that the elements of
Venizelos’s greatness have been . . . misconstrued both in his own country and abroad.”  233
Venizelos’s diplomatic achievements were, Pallis claimed, due to his negotiation skills not actual
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foresight.  The contention he made of the work was that it was closer to the actual truth than any
other Greek source.234
From what he observed and discovered, Pallis informed readers that the Greeks never
truly had a good chance of holding onto the Smyrna territory – certainly none of holding a large
expanse of Anatolia stretching east from Smyrna.  While fighting against the Turkish
Nationalists, Greece was fighting another conflict at home.  Pallis stressed that, “During the
whole duration of the war—that is from 1915 to 1922—Greece found herself torn between two
contending factions hating each other with a deadly hatred and bent on mutual extermination.”  235
This constant fracturing led to a decline of Greek strength during this period, even when it
appeared Greece had achieved triumphs.  The end result, Pallis noted, was that “It culminated, as
it was bound to do, in disaster—the military débâcle of August 1922 in Asia Minor.”236
According to Pallis, the military advisors to the Entente Powers strongly advised against
the policies that ended up in the Treaty of Sèvres.   The Greek Colonel Metaxas wrote up his
professional opinion that Greece should not attempt to occupy and annex Smyrna.  Pallis
summarized Metaxas’s argument that in spite of any superiority of the Greek army over the
Turks, the Greeks would gradually lose strength as it advanced further into Anatolia due to
increasing the size of its flanks and communication lines.  It was inevitable that the two armies
would reach an equilibrium point, where the Greeks would be forced to stop and form a
defensive front.  Of course, the Turks being in their home country could afford to wait and
prepare fully; when the Greeks were spread and at their weakest, the Turks would deal a crushing
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blow.  Metaxas warned the Greek government that they simply lacked the army or the allies to
conquer and defend Smyrna.  He and Pallis compared the inevitable failure to that of Napoleon’s
1812 invasion of Russia.237
The Greek military venture was unsound from the start.  Pallis criticized the initial
landing on 15 May 1919.  He admitted the violence of the landing by writing, “the gross bungling
. . . which resulted in much unnecessary disorder and bloodshed and undoubtedly queered the
pitch for all the subsequent operations by the unfavourable effect produced on the Turkish
population throughout Anatolia as well as on public opinion in Europe and America, is entirely
attributable to the incompetence of the Greek High Command. . .”   As a result, Pallis noted238
every foreign nation had to agree the landing was a political and military “gaffe,” as “It fanned to
a flame the smouldering fires of Turkish nationalism and gave Mustafa Kemal his chance.”  239
Aside from the bloodshed, the worst part of the landing in May was that the Allies
initiated it prior to the actual conclusion of peace terms and the Treaty of Sèvres.  Pallis placed
upon Venizelos “a fatal error” for having insisted and pushed the Entente leaders, despite “the
contrary opinion of the highest military authorities, both Allied (Foch, Wilson) and Greek
(Metaxas),” into consenting to the Smyrna landing at this premature time.   Pallis explained that240
within a year, the Greek army was unable to advance further into the interior to defeat the Turks
and unable to demobilize due to the need of guarding the occupied territory.  Quickly it became
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evident that “. . . it was merely a question of time before the Greek army was faced with the only
remaining alternative—that is, evacuation.”241
Compounding the error of ignoring military advisors, Venizelos misjudged the situation. 
Pallis, despite serving under him, criticized Venizelos for completely underestimating “the
gravity of the Kemalist resistance”.   Further, he noted, “The conditions essential to its [the242
Greek occupation’s] success, as postulated by Metaxas in his memoranda of January
1915—namely, the partition of Anatolia among the Allied Powers and the participation of
adequate Allied forces in the campaign—had not been fulfilled.”   Pallis placed the blame on243
Venizelos’s diplomacy for the failure to get the adequate support from the Allied Powers.  Had
Venizelos waited, Pallis supposed that the failure could have been avoided, as he could have
abandoned the offer of Smyrna and traded it to the Greek people for the gains of (Western and
Eastern) Thrace that was also granted in the Treaty of Sèvres.  
In opposition to some of his contemporaries, Pallis denied that the military failure
stemmed from the change of government (after a 1920 election ousted Venizelos and brought the
return of King Constantine) because the army was never capable of stably holding to the unsound
plan.  The shift and turnover in the government and military of Greece, Pallis contended, was
only “principally responsible for the magnitude of the final catastrophe.”   The attempt by244
observers and supporters of Venizelos to blame the defeat of Venizelos at the polls for the
military failures was an unfair instance of the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.
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The Entente Powers failed to support the Greek army with action which Pallis felt was
their responsibility for having consented to the landing at Smyrna – they should not have
approved the Greek action, if they could not and would not support it.  Here, Pallis echoed the
words of many other contemporary observers in describing the divergent interests and rivalries
among the Entente nations who used the peoples of the Near East as “mere pawns.”   The245
Greek military expedition, as the advisors reported, required the cooperation of all the victors of
the World War – Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and to a lesser extent, the United States. 
Even if the Greeks had been able to defeat Kemal in the field, the Allied Military Council
declared on 27 March 1920, that this would be insufficient because for victory they would have
“. . . to subdue the country and stamp out the guerilla bands.”   Greece could not maintain such246
a long, expensive conflict on its own.  Unfortunately for Greece, her other allies were unwilling
or unable to provide the men and resources for such an endeavor either.
France, Pallis observed, was opposed to the peace terms of Sèvres, as they were
impractical and the necessary costs of enforcement could not be afforded.  Furthermore, Pallis
pointed that in France, “Influential political, military, and financial circles conducted a powerful
press campaign in favour of conciliation with Turkey and against the policy of partition.”  247
Pallis observed consistent complaints from Greek authorities that French agents in Anatolia
showed sympathy for the Turks and obstructed the Greeks.  He points out one Colonel Delaunay
controlled the Oriental Railways and reportedly did everything in his power during May 1920 to
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hinder the transport of Greek troops and materials.   The Millerand Government that succeeded248
Clemenceau opened direct negotiations with Kemal, as it was under great pressure from
corporations with Turkish interests, eventually leading to the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement
between France and Turkey.
Italy, also failed to honor and support the commitments made by the Entente Powers. 
Before Greece entered the World War, Italy was hostile toward Greece because in her greed Italy
saw Greece not as a new ally “but an inconvenient partner in the future spoils of the Ottoman
Empire.”   In the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne of April 1917, Italy had laid claim to all of249
Smyrna and Southwestern Anatolia, which led her to never honestly accept the Greek claim.  250
Pallis reported that the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople, Count Sforza, had not only
been aware that Mustafa Kemal would form a resistance but directly aided and encouraged the
Nationalists with the Italians giving shelter to the guerilla bands in the south.251
With Bolshevik Russia replacing Tsarist Russia, there was one less power involved in the
partition scheme of the Ottoman Empire.  Russia no longer was going to pursue or gain control
over Constantinople, the Straits, and Armenia as it had in 1915 through the Constantinople
Agreement with the Entente.  The Allied statesmen, Pallis noted, did not appreciate the loss of
Russia as they greedily only saw it as “the elimination of an unwelcome competitor for Turkish
territory.”   As a result, during the World War the Entente continued to negotiate partitioning252
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mostly between England and France (Husayn-McMahon, Sykes-Picot, Balfour Declaration). 
However, what Venizelos and the other Entente leaders failed to appreciate was that now the
partition of the ‘Armenian’ region was not viable because it lacked Armenians and Russia’s
military.  The Bolsheviks sought a friendly relationship with the Nationalists as the Entente
Powers were their common enemy.  Kemal did not need to worry about defending another front
with Russia and could transport materials through their mutual border if needed.253
Even though the Entente Powers were not actually capable of spending the resources to
help the Greeks by partitioning Turkey, they were dedicated to keeping Venizelos in power, and
his public support was dependent upon Smyrna as a reward for efforts in the World War.  The
Entente had gone to great trouble forcing Greece into the World War with an Athens coup that
forcibly replaced the King, Constantine, with the pro-Entente Prime Minister Venizelos.  At the
time, the common view of British political circles was that Venizelos alone, in the Balkans, was
a disinterested friend.   If opinion in Greece turned against Venizelos, then it might turn against254
the Entente.  This could not occur because the Allies realized the Greek army was the only one
not exhausted and willing to enforce the Allied demands of victory.   Pallis further recorded255
that on 14 April 1919 the Secretary to the British Delegation at the Peace Conference wrote, “We
shall be unable to put the Greeks into Smyrna—I mean keep them there.  They can’t hold it
without Allied support or unless the whole of Turkey behind them is split up among the Allied
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Powers.  Yet if they do not get Smyrna Venizelos will fall from power.”   The situation was not256
winnable in this perspective advanced by Pallis.
Pallis attributed the Greeks being stuck in Smyrna to two men in particular.  Many
Greeks, since the independence in 1832, had a nationalistic desire to see a Greek state that would
incorporate all Greeks.  This Megali Idea sought to recreate a vast Byzantine state.  After the
victory of the Entente in the World War, Venizelos convinced them to compensate Greeks with
Ottoman territory for Greek self-determination, which was secured by delusion and ignorance
among the political leaders.   Aside from his leader, Venizelos, Pallis argued, 257
That the main responsibility for sending Greece to Smyrna must rest with Mr.
Lloyd George, who pursued a purely personal policy in direct opposition to the
views of his colleagues at the Foreign Office (Curzon), the War Office (Churchill)
and the India Office (Montagu) and against the expressed opinion of his principal
technical advisers. . .258
Lloyd George, as described by Pallis, was a philhellene, who was unfamiliar with the truth
concerning Turkey and what would be necessary for the Greeks to hold Smyrna.  His record
suggests that Lloyd George well-educated on the subject because “[h]is enthusiastic and sanguine
temperament led him to brush aside the objections of his technical advisers and of those of his
colleagues who were more expert in the affairs of the East.”   Pallis’s greatest criticism of259
Lloyd George is that continuing to give sincere, indirect encouragement to Greece to continue
fighting in Anatolia was a grave error in judgment.  Even after Venizelos was replaced by
Constantine in 1920 (through a surprising defeat in the 1920 elections and plebiscite for
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restoration of the throne), the Greek government continued to hear friendly words from the
British Prime Minister, which they – because it is what they wanted to believe – took as
assurance that he would support them.260
The perspective presented by Pallis displayed a great deal of unrealism and delusion on
the part of the Greeks and Lloyd George.  The expectation of the greedy partition plans for the
Ottoman Empire – made during the World War in opposition and without regard for the facts and
concerns of experts – to be enforced after four years of war and destruction, which sapped the
domestic will and resources of the Entente Powers, was wholly unrealistic.  Venizelos and the
Allied leaders were trapped in a paradox of their own design – needing to occupy Smyrna when it
could not be done and needing to support the Greeks when there was no support to give.
Conclusion:
The Turkish observers of the National Struggle traced the path back to the history of
reform, Western ideas, and secret societies – e.g., the Young Turks (CUP), the Turk Ojagi (The
Turkish Hearth), and Defense of Rights Associations.  Halide Edib and Ahmed Emin Yalman
both chronicled the importance of strong personalities that led the Turkish Nationalists.  The
power of these personalities and the dire situation created by the Greek invasion changed the
Turks from a defeated people to a determined, focused force for independence.  Yalman noted
that after the Mudros Armistice, “From the populace no marked reactions to the dissolution of
the Empire was [sic] noticeable, nor did there seem to be any will for national survival.”   Yet261
after the Greek landing at Izmir, Halide Edib wrote, “The long-talked-of defense which was
being organized in the Smyrna Mountains began to take shape very fast.  The inception of the
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movement was intimately connected with the political organization which was crystallizing
round Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Sivas.”262
The Entente (Allied) Powers made grave missteps in policy by not properly evaluating the
physical situation and the Turkish people.  The Entente leaders made plans on the assumptions of
domestic support and expenditures they no longer had after the World War ended.  The Ottoman
Empire had been defeated strategically, but the Entente mistook this as the Turkish people being
beaten.  There were still armed Turks throughout Anatolia, and the Entente made no attempts to
disarm the remote regions.
The most striking feature is that every one of the featured observers in this paper, at some
point, criticized the Entente Powers for victimizing the peoples and nations of the Near East by
“using” them as “pawns” and betting on them like “race horses”.  The Entente in a sense
attempted to utilize the Greek army to do its “dirty work” in Turkey.  The British observers,
Ellison and Toynbee, noted the distinct ignorance and foolishness among the Allied politicians. 
As Yalman declared, “Peace cannot be engendered by a warlike mentality geared to the spirit of
retaliation and revenge.”   Toynbee was able to provide an account from behind the Greek263
occupied lines, while Ellison visiting slightly later was able to chronicle from behind victorious
Nationalist lines and visit their leaders in Ankara.  The Turkish observers, Yalman and Edib,
colored the events of the Struggle with their inevitable emotional bias, which no doubt meant
exaggerations in their accounts.  However, their participation in the Struggle and their
exaggerations exemplify the Turkish Nationalist spirit and will.  Ellison observed, at the
Conference of Lausanne, a delegate asked Ismet Pasha, “‘. . . don’t you see the whole world is
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against you,’ to which came the dignified rejoinder, ‘We have become accustomed to that.’”264
The Nationalists’ dedication was strong and willing to fight whomever and however was
necessary for victory.
As Ellison warned, the Treaty of Sèvres, humiliated and punished the Turks to such a
degree that the Allied Powers could not “remove the foot holding them down—but ever so
slightly—” or the Turks would strike back.   With their lack of resources, the lack of265
commitment by their officers, and the lack of unity (rivalries) amongst themselves, the Entente
occupiers foot had no weight to keep the Turks suppressed.  The average Anatolian, as Nogales
and Edib noted, like “Zarageuz” is always mistreated and abused but always manages to end up
on top of his enemies, who find themselves in ridiculous positions.   The Treaty of Lausanne266
(thanks to the success of the National Struggle and the obstinance of Turkey at the Conference)
resulted in a real, mutual peace that allowed Turkey to finally begin to recover at home.
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